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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article addresses the deviance of interracial sexuality acknowledged in 
testamentary documents. The language of wills calls into question the authority of 
probate and family law by forcing issues of deviance into the public realm.  Will dramas, 
settled in or out of court, publicly unearth insecurities about family. Many objections to 
the stated intent of the testator generate from social prejudices toward certain kinds of 
interpersonal relationships: nonmarital, homosexual, and/or interracial.  When pitted 
against an issue of a moral or social transgression, testamentary intent often fails.  In 
order for these attacks on testamentary validity to succeed, they must be situated within 
an existing juridical framework that supports and adheres to the hegemony of denial that 
refuses to legitimate the wishes of the testator.  Disinherited white relatives of white 
testators regularly challenged wills disposing a majority of an estate to paramours and 
children of African descent.   In the nineteenth century, testators who eschewed 
traditional devises to spouses, relatives, and institutions in favor of mistresses, slaves, or 
both often incited will contests of testamentary incapacity, undue influence, or fraud.  
This Article is a case study of In Re Remley, an antebellum will contest between 
disinherited white collateral heirs and the intended black and mulatto devisees. It retains 
timeless value in its demonstration of the incompatibility of testamentary freedom and 
social deviance.  I conclude that subjective conceptions of kinship, in particular those 
unpopular relationships that defy social norms, prevent the idea of testamentary freedom 
from reaching diverse articulations of family. 
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Introduction 
Death is a tragedy, but its aftermath can be a drama.  In testamentary documents, 
decedents leave a record of posthumous wishes regarding the distribution of their estate.  
Such procedures nowhere approach anything legally extraordinary or exceptional—the 
vast majority of wills exist as unremarkable death documents of little interest to anyone 
but family members and acquaintances.  Still, private conflicts often evince larger issues 
than the mere distribution of property.1  They can reflect normative ideas about the 
proper recognition of family and societal limitations on kinship.2 Will dramas, settled in 
or out of court, bring unstated concerns and insecurities to the forefront, forcing a legal 
articulation of objections to the nontraditional distribution.3  When pitted against an issue 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University.  I would like to thank Don Herzog and Anita Allen for 
their thorough comments, and to various faculty colloquia and conferences at The American Society for 
Legal History, New York Law School, Seton Hall University, and the Syracuse University College of Law 
Junior Faculty Forum. Special thank you to Rachel Godsil and Annette Gordon-Reed for their elegant 
insight. 
1 For a through discussion of lawsuits over dispositions considered “unjust” or “unnatural,” see Susanna L. 
Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth 
Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 960 (2006).  
2 Modern courts have strayed from basing family court decisions, namely custody battles, on private biases. 
See, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (ruling that private biases and the possible injury they 
might inflict are impermissible considerations for removal of a white child from the custody of its natural 
mother who remarried a man of a different race). 
3 See generally, Adrienne Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 221 (1999).  See also, Mary Frances Berry, Mary Frances Berry, Judging Morality: Sexual 
Behavior and Legal Consequences in the Late Nineteenth-Century South, 78 J. OF AMER. HIST. 835-56 
(1991), Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, 8:2 Raritan, Fall 1998, 39-69.  
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of a moral or social transgression4, testamentary intent often fails.5  In order for these 
attacks on testamentary validity to succeed, they must be situated within an existing 
juridical framework that supports and adheres to the hegemony of denial that refuses to 
legitimate the wishes of the testator.   
Testamentary intent may enunciate a testator’s subjective interpretation of family, 
yet these subjective expectations of distribution may confound a more restrictive 
statutory scheme that is less permissive in its views of the parameters of kinship.6  
Balancing the state’s interest in the efficient distribution of property with the testator’s 
legal interest in bequeathing reveals an underexamined aspect of governmental regulation 
of diverse expressions of family.7  In most cases, wills pass quickly though probate 
because few challenges to the specific devises exist to slow and lengthen the probate 
process. Few legal barriers exist that prevent a civil spouse and their children from being 
considered as legitimate family members. It is the rarer and more diverse conceptions of 
family that must overcome a presumption of illegitimacy, even when the words of the 
testamentary document clearly indicate the familial role played by the disenfranchised.8 
Legal attempts to recognize the validity of a nontraditional family propel diverse 
conceptions of interpersonal relationships from margin to center.  Social norms of 
acceptable and plausible relationships have traditionally thwarted a decedent’s attempt to 
                                                 
4 See, Susannah Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary Freedom in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959, 960 (2006). 
5 See generally, Melanie Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996). 
6 Id. at 238 (discussing courts’ commitment to seeing that testators uphold a duty to family.) 
7 Diverse expressions of family—unmarried heterosexual couples and also homosexual couples—find that 
their expressions of commitment fail to receive the same easy protections of the heteronormative nuclear 
family.  For an excellent article exploring these restrictions on family, see Laura Rosenbury, Two Ways to 
End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227 (2005).  
8 See Leslie at 236 (refuting the “oft-repeated axiom that testamentary freedom is the polestar of wills 
law”).  
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circumvent well-established distribution schemes of probate law.9  Spouses may not 
disinherit each other, and in some states, marital children have stronger claims upon an 
estate than nonmarital children.10  Additionally, adopted children have the same 
testamentary rights as biological children.11  Testators who want to disinherit their current 
spouse, restrict their nonmarital children, or differentiate between adoptive and biological 
children stand upon shallow legal ground, even under the ideology of testamentary 
freedom.  Equity, as defined by the state, intervenes to recalibrate the inefficient and 
unfair distribution of estates. 
Estate reformation according to principles of equity works in two ways.  While it 
is often true in will disputes that two sides exists to every story, state supported 
restrictions that rein in testamentary freedom may tautologically disadvantage those 
recognitions of family relationships that conflict with state public policy.12  On one hand, 
statutory schemes protect vulnerable family members from predictable patterns of 
disinheritance that disfavor neglected spouses13 and nonmarital, nonbiological children.14  
Securing the inheritance interests of these frequently marginalized constituencies 
institutes a norm of familial equality in estate succession by curtailing the actions of 
testators who actively or constructively disinherit closely related family members. On the 
other hand, these same statutory schemes remain underinclusive, as they may not provide 
                                                 
9 Id. Ralph Brashier offers a comprehensive examination of diverse families and the problems they face 
with inheritance.  See, R. Brashier, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY (2004). 
10 Id. at 12. 
11 See, Susan Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. J. 1 (2000); Jan E. 
Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What and Why?, 37 VAND. L. REV. 
711 (1984);  
12 See supra note 9.  
13 The Uniform Probate Code allows for spouses who were left out of a premarital will to recover the same 
amount as an intestate share, with some exceptions. UPC §2-301. Additionally, all spouses displeased with 
their share in a will may opt for an elective share, depending on the length of the marriage. UPC §2-202. 
14 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional an Illinois statute prohibiting a 
nonmarital child from inheriting from its biological father).   
 6 
legal protection for those infinitely diverse articulations of family and association that 
exist beyond the comprehension and acceptance of the law.15   
But the idea of the “changing American family” has perpetually been in flux, and 
the only constant aspect has been the law’s recognition of a limited version of it.16  
Marriage has long stood as the unifying characteristic of family, yet this venerable 
institution has been subject to state control.17  It has prevented people of the same sex18 
from legal consolidation of their interests, as well as interracial couples,19 related 
people,20 minors,21 and slaves.22  Couples who fit the state’s conception of appropriate 
prospective spouses receive state protection of their relationship and of their property.23  
For those relationships existing outside of this realm of approval, securing these same 
rights proved a remarkably difficult process.  Concomitant with regulation of marriage is 
the regulation of property transmission, and stringent controls on who can get married 
necessarily dictates, in turn, who may inherit.24   
The language of wills calls into question the authority of probate and family law 
by forcing issues of deviance into the public realm.25  This Article addresses the deviance 
                                                 
15 See supra note 9. 
16 See, ANITA BERNSTEIN, MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (2005).  
17 See, Davis supra note 3 at fn15.  See also,  Milton Regan, Jr., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE 
MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE (1999). 
18 David Chambers, What If: The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of lesbian and Gay 
Male Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447 (1996).  
19 Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a state statue prohibiting interracial 
marriages).  Despite the Supreme Court’s 1967 ruling, Alabama formally held on to antimiscegenation law 
until the year 2000. Kevin Johnson, Taking The “Garbage” Out in Tulia, Texas: The Taboo on Black-
White Romance and Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs”, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 283, 300 (2007). 
20 Singh v. Singh, 213 Conn. 637 (1990) (voiding a marriage between a half-uncle and a half-niece). 
21 Moe V. Dinkins 533 F.Supp 623 (1982).  See also, Lynn Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age Restrictions, 
21 J. FAM. L. 1 (1983).  
22 See, Davis, supra note 3 at fn 9. Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the 
Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 330-31 (1996) (summarizing effects of enslavement on 
inheritance). 
23 See, Brashier, supra note 9.  
24 See generally, Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).  
25 Blumenthal at 966.  
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of interracial sexuality acknowledged in testamentary documents. In addition to the 
administrators, the will announces to others the sincerity of the testator’s interracial 
wishes, and it formally acknowledges an interpretation of “family” not frequently and 
willingly admitted as legitimate. Disinherited white relatives of white testators regularly 
challenged wills disposing a majority of an estate to paramours and children of African 
descent.26   In the nineteenth century, testators who eschewed traditional devises to 
spouses, relatives, and institutions in favor of mistresses, slaves, or both often incited will 
contests of testamentary incapacity, undue influence, or fraud.27  When social and legal 
practices denied the existence and possibility of mixed race,28 the act of memorializing an 
interracial connection in a legal document confounds this nonexistence.  In the eyes of 
the state, probating an interracial will that requests an acknowledgement of forbidden 
love29 and its fruits threatens not only the authority of the law, but it also would permit 
legal equality among blacks and whites.  Interracial marriage brings with it interracial 
property.  
This specific case, In re Remley30, concerns the familiar antebellum taboo: what 
Mary Boykin Chesnut called the “monstrous system” of miscegenation and slavery.  This 
case demonstrates the influence of racial privilege on the viability of testamentary 
freedom.  First, in 1861, a scheming relative accused her “white” and recently widowed 
                                                 
26 See Jason Gillmer, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 535, 597. See also, Bernie Jones, Righteous Fathers,” “Vulnerable 
Old Men,” and “Degraded Creatures”: Southern Justices on Miscegenation in the Antebellum Will 
Contest, 40 TULSA L. REV. 699 (2005) 
27 Blumenthal at 964.  
28 Kevin Noble Maillard, The Multiracial Ephiphany, (forthcoming FORD. L. REV. 2008) (on file with 
author) 
29 Id.  
30 These materials are located in the South Carolina Historical Society, where they previously sat unread in 
the records of a nineteenth-century Charleston law firm, Rutledge and Young.  I found no reference to the 
Remley family in historical surveys or scholarly articles.  Essentially, their existence fettered away with the 
passage of time.  Their name does exist, however, in the title of a local neighborhood, Remley’s Point, 
which had once served as a Freedmen’s settlement, athletic complex, and now a site for luxury residential 
development. 
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cousin, Mary Remley, of being a black slave.  If the cousin succeeded in her claim, Mary 
and her children, as slaves, could not legally stand as beneficiaries of her deceased 
husband’s will, thus enabling the cousin to inherit as the legitimate next of kin.  With 
their late father’s will at stake, the children successfully proved their untainted claim to 
whiteness, which cleared any racial impediments to their inheritance.   
Years later, these same children would revisit the interracial issue again upon the 
death of their brother, Paul Durbin Remley, of Charleston, South Carolina.  In his will, he 
disinherited his sisters in favor of his black slave mistress, Philis, and their two children, 
Charles and Cecile.31  His collateral heirs challenged the will on grounds of insane 
delusion, arguing that the gunshot wound that precipitated his death rendered him 
incapable of writing a valid will.32  Although the Civil War and emancipation predated 
Durbin’s will, the sisters succeeded in characterizing Philis as the object of property 
rather than its recipient.  To them and to the courts, Philis was not an heir, but evidence 
of the postwar devaluation of Durbin’s estate.33  Former slaves failed to meet the social 
and legal requirements for “family.” 
This historical approach to wills law demonstrates a legal antecedent for 
contemporary lawmakers, scholars, and students contemplating the evolution of the 
American family.34  Remley tests the elasticity of testamentary freedom.  Using race as a 
proxy to determine appropriate family relationships amongst the Remleys separates legal 
reality from practical reality.  While the law allowed whites to shield family property 
                                                 
31 From the time Durbin wrote the will until its execution, the black beneficiaries had been emancipated by 
proclamation.  See Paul Durbin Remley Will infra note 105. 
32 Infra note 69. 
33 Id. 
34 Maillard, supra note 28.  Diverse families have always existed in the United States, yet law has 
prevented them from becoming legitimate forms of interpersonal expression, and in turn, more publicly 
acknowledged. Law affects collective memory so that our vision of the past accedes to a vision of legal 
possibilities and prohibitions.  
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from the testamentary interests of potential black heirs, this tells a very different story 
from the lived experiences of the people whose very existences challenged the boundaries 
of race—and impacted the decisions of the testator.  Legal narratives painted a picture of 
a white family untainted by intimate connections with persons of color, thus limiting the 
number of people who could call themselves legitimate members of the family.  Social 
reality, however, reveals a complexity of interpersonal and interracial relationships not 
explained in rigid laws.35   
Even though the time and place of In re Remley appears remote from our own, it 
retains timeless value in its demonstration of the incompatibility of testamentary freedom 
and social deviance.  Devises left to unorthodox heirs face additional levels of scrutiny 
even in the face of plain language indicating intent of inheritance.36  Section One 
discusses South Carolina’s unique racial climate, providing a political background for the 
case study which follows in Section Two. Here, I introduce the case of Mary Remley, a 
white widow accused of being a black slave.  In the challenge to this claim, which 
threatened her children’s inheritance of their father’s will, race is employed as a deterrent 
to free inheritance.  The last Section looks at the younger Remley son’s bequest to a 
black slave and their two children.  In this conflict, race shifts from a disqualifier to an 
indicator of the limits of family when his sisters contested the will.  Finally, I conclude 
that subjective conceptions of kinship, in particular those unpopular relationships that 
                                                 
35 Mary Boykin Chesnut’s diary reveals the conflict between public oblivion and private knowledge of the 
interracial sexuality of the slave system: 
God forgive us, but ours is a monstrous system and wrong and iniquity....Like the patriarchs of old 
our men live all in one house with their wives and their concubines, and the mulattoes one sees in 
every family exactly resemble the white children - and every lady tells you who is the father of all 
the mulatto children in everybody's household, but those in her own she seems to think drop from 
the clouds… 
Davis, supra note 3 fn 286.  
36 See Leslie, supra note 5.  
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defy social norms, prevent the idea of testamentary freedom from reaching diverse 
articulations of family.  
 
II. Miscegenation in South Carolina 
B. Legal Pliancy of Race in South Carolina 
Miscegenation existed as a given fact in each of the slave states. In his 
comprehensive study on American mulattoes, Joel Williamson comments, if Freud was 
only generally correct, “it is safe to assume that the lines of lust in the old South ran 
continually and in all directions.”37  Slavemasters, as possessors of people as property, 
usurped these claims to fulfill their libidinous desires.  The concubinage of black women 
by white men formed the majority of interracial relations, although unions between black 
men and white women were not unknown.38  A northern traveler in South Carolina 
commented, “The enjoyment of a Negro or mulatto woman is spoken of as quite a 
common thing; no reluctance, delicacy, or shame is made about the matter.”39  The 
forgiving climate for race mixing hinged on an explanation of miscegenation as a safe 
harbor for the wanton desires of red-blooded white men free to “Imbibe the Blackness of 
the Charmer’s Skin,” as noted in an 18th century Charleston periodical.40  
                                                 
37 JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MULATTOES AND MISCEGENATION IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (New 
York, 1980). 
38 Although this aspect of miscegenation deserves mention, it goes beyond the scope of this project. For a 
comprehensive examination of this nexus of race and gender, see MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK 
MEN, infra note 102. I am primarily concerned with the darkening of wealth, that is, mulatto inheritance 
from white kin, which concerns the transfer of property from white men to mixed race offspring.  See also 
ROBERT J. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW 16-19 (Albuquerque 1972) (explaining sexual stereotypes 
of black men and white women).  
39 WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 145 
(Chapel Hill, 1968). 
40 Quoted in CHARLESTON S-C GAZETTE, March 11, 1732, in Jordan, supra note 39 at 146. 
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 The rituals of bedroom integration faced no formal obstructions to extending the 
temporary physical relation into a significant romantic liaison.  Surely, feelings of love 
and attraction developed as undocumented relationships between mistress and master,41 
but other interracial couples formalized their connection by law.  Unlike other states, 
South Carolina did not prohibit interracial marriage until after the Civil War and in 
Charleston occasional marriages occurred between persons of color and well-regarded 
whites.  The state suspended the prohibition in 1868, only to reenact it in 1879.42  
Although Loving v. Virginia43 rendered all antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional, the 
state retained the law in its books until 1999.44 
 Perhaps this liberality extended from powerful white judges who vehemently 
opposed a concrete definition of racial boundaries.  In South Carolina’s high court, 
Justice William Harper45 set a notorious precedent that influenced his successors’ rulings 
on racial classification.  Ruling on two cases in 1831 that set a legal precedent for the 
fluidity of the color line, Harper eschewed the common southern practice of fractional 
                                                 
41 Interracial relations between free white men and enslaved black women generate a host of reactions 
addressing the nature and/or possibility of consent. Many scholars would argue that slave status precludes 
any form of consent and a loving relationship, thus making all liaisons between free men and slave women 
rape. Others may view the relationships as mutually beneficial, with black women acceding to these 
relationships in search of better futures for themselves and their children.  Analyzing the consensual 
possibilities of these relationships goes beyond the scope of this article, but I do believe it would be 
overinclusive and anachronistic to forestall a possibility of mutual interracial attraction. See, Davis, supra 
note 3 at n10 (citing Eugene Genovese’s analysis of master-slave relationships beginning as exploitation 
and turning into love).  
42 See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 75-6 
(New York, 2003); PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE, MARRIAGE, AND 
LAW—AN AMERICAN HISTORY 103-4 (2002). 
43 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
44 S.C. Const. Ann. Art. III, 33 (2003) 
45 Other scholars have discussed Harper’s curious defenses of slavery and also miscegenation. See, Daniel 
Sharfstein, Crossing The Color Line: Racial Migration And The One-Drop Rule, 1600-1860, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 592, 628 (2007) (nothing that Harper’s “jurisprudence fostered a permeable color line, [but he] 
lectur[ed] extensively in favor of slavery”); Mitchell Crusto, Blackness As Property: Sex, Race, Status, And 
Wealth, 1 STAN. J. CIV. R & CIV. LIB 51, 84 (2005) (characterizing Harper as turning interracial sex “into a 
virtue”); Robert Westley, First-Time Encounters: “Passing” Revisited And Demystification As A Critical 
Practice, 18 YALE LAW AND POLICY REV., 297, 318 (2000) (describing Harper’s rejection of the visual 
paradigm of race). 
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genealogy for an interpretive approach to racial designation.  In his appellate decisions on 
State v. Davis and State v. Hanna, he wrote that, 
There is considerable difficulty in laying down an exact rule on this 
subject, and it may not perhaps be necessary to do so.  There is no legal 
definition of the term [mulatto]. The popular definition in this State, by 
which we must be governed, seems to be vague, signifying, generally, a 
person of mixed white, or European, and Negro descent, in whatever 
proportions the blood may be mixed.  The distinctions which have 
obtained in the French and Spanish American colonies, and in our sister 
State of Louisiana, in relation to persons of mixed European and Negro 
blood, have not been admitted in this state.46 
 
Setting a widely-cited precedent, Justice Harper denounced a legal definition of race.47  
This stance toward Negro law in the state classified many persons as white when other 
slave states would classify them as mulatto.  This vague interpretation primarily relied on 
physical appearance48 instead of descent, recognizing that “every admixture of African 
blood with the European, or white, is not to be referred to the degraded class.”49 
 It is important to note that hypodescent50, or the “one drop rule,” claims no place 
in South Carolina’s antebellum legal history.  The existence of a single African ancestor 
in a person’s genealogy did not always classify one in the lower caste.  Lawmakers were 
keenly aware of miscegenation’s extent, and they probably knew that the relentless hunt 
for black ancestry could have destroyed the reputation of many white persons.  Perhaps 
these lawmakers realized that the establishment of the one-drop rule could have struck 
                                                 
46 8 S.C. Eq. 559 (Bail. Eq.) (1831). 
47 See Westley, supra note 45 at 318. 
48 Appearance has been adjudicated in other contexts to be an unreliable characteristic of race. See Rich, 
infra note 50.  
49 Id. 
50 See, Kevin Noble Maillard, The Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of American Indian Ancestry 
from Racial Purity Law 12 MICH J RACE & L 351, 354, (2007) (analyzing different applications of the one-
drop rule to Native Americans and African-Americans); Rachel Moran, Loving and the Legacy of 
Unintended Consequences, 2007 WISC. L. REV. 239, 244; Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial And 
Ethnic Identity: Discrimination By Proxy And The Future Of Title Vii, 79 NYU L. REV. 1134, 1150 (2004); 
Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1731 (2000); Donald 
Braman, Of Race and Immutability 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1397 (1999). 
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close to home, and possibly create a “very cruel and mischievous” situation.51  To ward 
off potential destructions of racial reputation, judges remained silent on genealogical 
exactions.  
 
B.  Race as a Factor of Reputation, not Ancestry 
 Justice Harper’s insistence on the fluidity of whiteness relied on the recollection 
of the past of claimants and their peers in the determination of race.  Even with proof of 
African ancestry, South Carolina courts still declared some persons as white.52  In State v. 
Cantey in 1835,53 objectors challenged the legitimacy of two white-appearing witnesses 
to testify in an indictment for larceny.  Nonwhite persons were not allowed to serve as 
witnesses or jurors, and worried defendants sometimes attempted to paint key witnesses 
as racially questionable in order to block their incriminating testimony.  The witnesses in 
Cantey, as brothers, had a white father, and their mother was a “descendent in the third 
degree of a half breed who had a white wife.”54  An extraordinary history of white 
acceptance had run long in their family.  Interestingly enough, their maternal grandfather, 
described as a dark-skinned man, held the reputation of a white man, and one of their 
relatives of the same “admixture” married into a wealthy white family and ran for the 
state legislature.  The court found the witnesses as one-sixteenth black, in opposition to 
their reputation in the community as white.  Seeing that remote African ancestry did not 
                                                 
51 JAMES HUGO JOHNSTON, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA AND MISCEGENATION IN THE SOUTH 205 
(Kingsport, 1970). 
52 Reputation and race in the antebellum south were often interdependent, allowing people with African 
ancestry to be legally considered white.  See generally Marie-Amelie George, The Modern Mulatto: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Social and Legal Positions of Mulattoes in the Antebellum South and the 
Intersex in Contemporary America, 15 COL. J. GENDER & L. 665 (2006); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: 
The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000).   
53 11 S.C. Eq. 614 (2 Hill Eq.) (1835). 
54 Id. 
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disturb their reputation as white, Justice Harper dismissed the case, apologizing for the 
“unnecessary violence” to the gentlemen.  
 Even though the evidence proved the witnesses’ African descent, the court 
secured their reputations as white citizens.  Harper disregarded the existence of African 
ancestry as the sole determinant for membership in a race group.  Describing a person 
with no visible mixture of black blood, he remarked “it would be an absurdity in terms to 
say that such an one is, in the popular sense of the word, a person of color.”55  With this 
logic, Harper argued for reputation rather than ancestry, and he insisted that one’s 
establishment within the white caste secured that classification. 
The condition of the individual is not to be determined solely by the 
distinct and visible mixture of negro blood, but by reputation, by his 
reception into society, and his having commonly exercised the privileges 
of a white man.  But his admission to these privileges, regulated by the 
public opinion of the community in which he lives, will very much depend 
on his own character and conduct; and it may be well and proper that a 
man of worth, honesty, industry, and respectability, should have the rank 
of a white man, while a vagabond of the same degree of blood should be 
confined to the inferior caste.56 
 
This interpretation granted the visibly black grandfather of the witnesses the legal status 
as white, because he exerted the privileges of free white citizens.  Thus was the beginning 
of a social definition of race, determined by racial alliances and public opinion instead of 
being handed down at birth. 
 Another case in St. Paul’s Parish illustrates the legal negations of race, reputation, 
and memory.  In Johnson v. Brown (1842), a tax collector attempted to collect a 
capitation tax from two fair-skinned brothers, Thomas and Henry Johnson, as mulattoes.  
In antebellum times, the state kept track of and profited from the free Negro population 
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by taxing each person.57  The brothers objected, declaring themselves free white men, and 
they allowed themselves to be inspected by the jury.  The court reporter remarked, “On 
inspection, I thought Thomas and John very passable white men.  Thomas, particularly, 
had light or sandy hair, and a sunburnt complexion.  John was a darker man, black hair, 
and a skin of a darker shade than his brother.”58  The court also called in witnesses who 
testified that the community sometimes regarded the men as colored, other times as not.  
They did possess voting rights, but in one instance, an acquaintance extracted their 
ballots from the voting box and scratched their names off the list of registered voters.  
The jury did not inspect the brothers’ family, rationalizing that “color…was a deceptive 
test.”59  Finding that classifying the Johnson brothers as black would represent “bad 
policy,” the jury “very properly” classified them as white.60 
 These cases raise a question of the link between genetics and memory.  
Considering that judges like Harper allowed reputation to trump ancestry, the legal act of 
determining race depended heavily on the factfinder’s interpretation of the defendant’s 
reputation as white.  It appears that in each of these cases, the defendants all possess a 
detectable quantity of African blood.  The court opinions make no secret of this 
knowledge, although they do mention that the defendants carefully selected their guests, 
witnesses, and relatives to appear in the courtroom.  Suspiciously dark relatives remained 
at large.  Despite the existence of black ancestry, the courts entirely dispensed with black 
blood as the sole determinant of racial membership.  In this rejection of genetics, the 
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court not only sets a new standard for race, but it also refuses to settle upon a steadfast 
bar for blackness and ancestral minimums.61   
Reputation cases, infrequent in number, left race to the mercy of the judge’s gavel 
or to the approval of the community.  Harper shared the intellectual opinion of Judge 
Frost, who in White v. Tax Collector (1846), argued that a strict adherence to a legal 
definition of white and black did not provide a reliable measurement of citizenship.  
Judge Frost, in his rulings, accounted for “honesty, sobriety, and industry, and the 
qualities that unite in a respectable character” in perceiving whiteness.62  Like his 
counterpart, Frost refused to establish a doctrine of racial determination, insisting that it 
“be decided by public opinion, expressed in the verdict of a jury.”63  This stance 
entertains community estimations of race by taking personal identity from the jurisdiction 
of the individual and auctioning it off in the courts.  The way that others remembered or 
perceived a person, not what the person thought of him/herself, became the legal standard 
for racial classification.   
But courts did not completely dispense with genealogical evidence.  In some 
cases, reputation could not supplant ancestry.  Martha White, an educated teacher married 
to a white man, exercised the same “good character and correct deportment” as a white 
woman, and enjoyed the accompanying rights and privileges.64  Yet, Martha’s 
appearance, which Judge Frost described as “obviously a colored person,” precluded her 
free assimilation, which he would have approved had she lacked the telltale features of 
taint.  This example demonstrates the whimsical nature of classification: Mrs. White is 
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“colored,” but her children were “white; she married, lived, and socialized as white, and 
held this reputation in her community.”65  Yet, the court, showing its mercurial nature, 
still classified her, but not her children, as mulatto.66  
 
II. Using Race as a Deterrent 
The story of the Remley family is remarkable because it illustrates how external 
pressures simultaneously threaten and bolster their status as a family.  Depending on the 
angle, law acts both to exclude and include, and the ability to utilize law to their best 
advantage turns on their secure claim to whiteness.  The common link of blood that tied 
the Remleys—black, white, or possibly mulatto—to each other did not automatically 
enable a fluid and free conception of family.  For those who were able to claim the legal 
privileges of whiteness, they employed law to restrict the economic benefits of family 
membership to exclude those who could not. 
Paul Remley, a free white man, died in Charleston in November of 1860.67  He 
left his wife, Mary Remley, a farm in Pennsylvania consisting of “19.5 acres of poor land 
but healthy with two small storm houses on it, no farm buildings, one old shed.”68  He 
appointed his son, Paul Durbin Remley (“Durbin”) as administrator of the estate, and the 
younger Remley assumed charge on December 1, 1860.69  Widowed, Mrs. Remley 
assumed possession of the farm from November 29 until her death three years later.  In 
the following summer of 1861, Durbin filed for a grant of administration of his father’s 
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will.  In this capacity, he was expected to share the profits of the estate with his siblings: 
Elizabeth Hubbell (née Remley) and Emma Remley.  At this time, the siblings were 
dispersed along the eastern seaboard, with Durbin residing in Charleston and the sisters in 
Pennsylvania.  
 
C. The Accusation of Mary Shrine 
A conflict arose when Durbin applied for the grant on June 3, 1861—the same 
day that a challenger questioned his legitimacy as an administrator.  Mary Shrine, 
claiming to be his second cousin, filed a complaint in a Charleston Court of Ordinary 
alleging herself to be a legitimate next of kin.70  Durbin and his sisters, she alleged, were 
rendered ineligible due to the status of their mother.  Mrs. Shrine filed an affidavit which 
argued that “the supposed widow of Paul Remley is a colored person” and that “she was 
purchased by said Paul Remley as a slave.”71  Due to this social incapacity, she attempted 
to position herself as having not only a superior claim on the estate, but the only 
legitimate entitlement to distribution.  If she proved Mary Remley as a slave, then her 
grown children would follow her diminished status; Paul, Elizabeth, and Emma would 
immediately become slaves, and ineligible to stand as legal heirs.72  
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Mary Shrine based her argument on South Carolina’s 1841 Act to Prevent the 
Emancipation of Slaves.73  This Act prohibited testamentary emancipations, and it also 
voided all bequests to slaves.  Section IV reads, “That every devise or bequest, to a slave 
or slaves, or to any person, upon a trust or confidence, secret or expressed, for the benefit 
of any slave or slaves, shall be null and void.”74  Even if the Remleys had considered 
themselves free white persons, the possibility of a hidden condition of their mother 
threatened their ability to inherit their father’s estate.  Legal definitions of children’s 
status throughout the South followed Roman law by declaring partus sequitur ventrem—
that children followed the condition of the mother.75  It must be pointed out, however, 
that race did not serve as a constant determinant of status.  For children with parents of 
different races, the mother could be black or mulatto and pass her free status to her child.  
Likewise, children of black or mulatto slave fathers and free white women, while very 
few in number, retained free status, despite their father’s condition.  These distinctions 
mattered, as this would not only come to court as a race versus reputation case, but a 
legal determination of one’s basic rights.   
The accusation of diminished legal and racial status, however farfetched, 
generated a flurry of representations of Remley family history.  The competing claims to 
the status of Mary Remley, who offered no voice in the available correspondence, 
demonstrate a flurry of legal panic in the race to reassert the primacy of whiteness and 
freedom.  If the Remley children followed the condition of their mother, not only would 
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they lose testamentary and legal standing, but also their public reputations as free white 
persons.      
In an effort to bolster their legitimacy, the Remleys offered testimony from 
“respectable” white persons to verify their freedom and race. These narrative 
contributions necessarily referred to the past, offering a subjective view of Mary 
Remley’s standing in the community.  These acts of remembering had legal and practical 
relevance, but they also reasserted the Remley family as white, privileged citizens.  In 
reconstructing their racial identity by means of community opinion, the family followed a 
well-established precedent.  Whether these claims were made public outside the 
protection of the court remains unknown, but the singular assertion and multiple 
refutations as documented in the legal records commemorate a type of juridical 
discussion of sexual and racial privacy that was routinely relegated beyond the scope of 
public discourse.   
The Remley “defendants,” like any party in litigation, selectively remembered 
advantageous facts and omitted pejorative ones.  Soon after the supposed cousin filed the 
accusatory affidavit in the Court of Ordinary, the Remley party called upon Sam Wagner, 
a free white man and a churchgoing citizen of Charleston, to verify Mrs. Remley’s 
whiteness.  As a member of Bethel Methodist Church, Mr. Wagner testified that Mr. and 
Mrs. Remley were “always recognized as white persons in the use of all the privileges of 
the Church”76  He continues by attesting to their status as “acceptable members” and 
active “Class Leaders.”  Unmentioned in this written testimony are references to 
miscegenation or slavery.  Mr. Wagner’s narrative limits itself to public interpretations of 
racial identity.  As expected, he makes no mention of Mrs. Remley’s questionable 
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origins, focusing instead on Mr. Remley’s secure status as a free white man and Mrs. 
Remley’s white father.  Additionally, he remains silent on the Church’s significant black 
and mulatto members, who at that time constituted the majority of Charleston’s black 
Methodists, approximately 6,000 in number.77 
Characterizing the allegation as a “question of Pedigree and legitimacy,”78 the 
Court of Ordinary postponed the decision of grant in order to accommodate the 
contestant Mrs. Shrine by allocating one week for her to provide corroborating testimony.    
When she failed to prove the slavery claim, the Court found Durbin legally competent to 
administer his father’s estate.  In the absence of supporting evidence from Mrs. Shrine 
regarding the truth of her accusation, Wagner’s sole opposing affidavit proved sufficient 
to defeat the objection to Durbin’s grant of administration.   The Court qualified this 
ruling, however, by distinguishing legitimacy for administration from legitimacy for 
distribution.  Noting that the possible truth of Shrine’s claim would not greatly affect the 
pending grant, the Court added “altho it may become so in a progress of settlement of 
assets of said Estate.”79 
Legally, the Court’s finding voided the issue, but the family continued to discuss 
the “great annoyance and mortification.”80  In correspondence and memoranda, Elizabeth 
Hubbell continued to refute the claims of race and slavery, writing from Philadelphia to 
her brother Durbin “a very long epistle” chronicling their family’s history of 
respectability and whiteness.81  Mrs. Hubbell’s pride prevents her from explicitly 
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addressing the assault to her family’s racial identity, telling her brother that “the 
astonishment the thing has occasioned may be better imagined than described.”82  To her 
knowledge, their father was “not the man to lower himself by such a degrading act as is 
alleged.”83  She viewed these charges as a “conspiracy” organized by “low people” who 
unjustifiably wanted to deprive the Remley children of their inheritance.  In desperation, 
Hubbell expressed her conviction that the “whole thing [was] gotten up by some of 
[Durbin’s] enemies,” notwithstanding the “[un]intelligent” Mrs. Shrine whose “Mother 
was subject to some sort of fits.”84 
 
D. Remembering Racial Security 
Elizabeth Hubbell takes an adversarial stance in her letters, which makes these 
documents a source of critical interpretation.  It could be true that writing letters served as 
an outlet for her racial frustrations, but they also advocate a biased conception of her 
family’s racial identity.  Hubbell draws on interactions her mother had with other whites 
to suggest that Mrs. Remley could not have been anything other than white.  Looking 
backward to the past for explanation, she draws upon unquestioned relationships to 
justify her own self-identity and that of her mother.  Similar to the reconstructions of 
history invoked by Chesnutt’s Aunt Polly and Faulkner’s Miss Rosa, she becomes the 
architect of her family’s history by realigning the past to justify her present needs.  In the 
same way that the fictional characters recite the past as they wish to see it, they believe 
the stories they sow themselves so that alternative conceptions become fallacious 
invasions on their racial freedom and status.  Elizabeth’s manner of imposing meaning 
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upon the past makes it her own, rather than Mrs. Shrine’s, whom she insists has no 
tenable claim on her family’s racial standing.  Even if Hubbell’s labor of remembering 
finds ground in unstable sources, she appropriates a verisimilitude to her past that may be 
at odds with historical truths.85 
Three primary examples of lived whiteness form her grounds for remembering 
her family as white.  First, she recalls that her mother was registered at the multiracial 
Bethel Methodist Church in Charleston as a “free white person,” a demonstrative fact 
which she interprets as conclusive proof.   “[H]ad there been any doubt of the fact,” she 
writes, “I imagine her name could not have been entered there.”86  Her reliance on the 
church’s record of its members does not account for the possibility of errors in 
representation, similar to simple and learned mistakes of census takers.87  Second, her 
mother’s wedding to her father at Bethel serves as proof of their supposedly 
irreproachable whiteness.  She maintains that her mother’s bridesmaids were “ladies of 
respectability” who would not be “intimate with a person of doubtful pretensions.” 
Elizabeth blindly accepts a tautology of race and reputation that equates “respectability” 
with whiteness and freedom and “doubtful pretensions” with blackness and slavery. Her 
logic assumes an if/then calculation that makes reputation a barometer of racial identity: 
“If she had been purchased and held as a slave all these things could not have been.”88  
Here, she constructs her own memory according to permissible instances of monoracial 
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interaction, thus negatively gleaning identity from interpretations of what things were 
not.  Lastly, she turns to her mother’s parentage and upbringing, noting that her mother’s 
mother was an orphan, “brought up by strangers.”  Her mother’s father, of Jacksonboro, 
South Carolina, “was of a respectable family, scarcely likely to intermarry with a low 
person.”89  Because Hubbell could not rely upon antimiscegenation law to prove that her 
parents’ marriage was not illegal or interracial (i.e. that her parents were both white), she 
had no other options outside of reputation and respectability to demonstrate that her 
mother was not a black slave.   
Elizabeth Hubbell’s husband William rushed to his wife’s defense by composing 
a memorandum to his attorney that traced the ancestry of his wife’s mother.90  He too 
employed an equation of race and reputation to dismiss Shrine’s claims.  Polite white 
persons marry and consort with persons like themselves.  Mrs. Remley married a decent 
white man, and kept company with proper white Charlestonians.  Therefore, Mrs. Remley 
must be white.  He fortifies this logic with genealogical information about her parents 
Thomas and Leah Whitley, offering additional evidence to his wife’s rendition.  Thomas 
Whitley, he argues, came from an English family of “respectable noble descent,” which 
he attests to be listed in Burke’s Peerage of Landed Gentry.91  Leah, on the other hand, he 
portrays as a daughter of a fallen soldier of the Revolutionary War and a woman of 
unknown origins.  Remarkably, he does not question any deeper meaning or possibility of 
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“unknown.”  Still, this liaison of high and low, noble and plebian produced “an 
exemplary moral and Christian woman” who with her husband, operated a well-known 
grocery store in Charleston.  
Although Elizabeth and William’s accounts of Remley family history fervently 
denounce what they judge as “hatred, slander, perjury and conspiracy,” their 
reconstructions of the past do not exactly mirror each other.  William’s discussion of 
Thomas and Leah Whitley extols their mercantile skills and civic respectability.  He also 
emphasizes Thomas Whitley’s English family as “not of common or feudal descent.”92  
His flattering rendition sharply contrasts with Elizabeth’s, which, in the letter to Durbin, 
confesses “of course our Grandparents were poor.”93  She paints a darker picture of her 
forebears, relaying tales of a bankrupt and “intemperate” husband who had lost 
everything during the Revolutionary War.  His wife, who carried their grocery business 
during his bouts of depression, left him, joining her son in Massachusetts, who she had 
previously sent away “to keep him out of the way of bad example.”94  These different 
interpretations demonstrate the effect of audience awareness in persuasive 
correspondence.  Although renditions of historical memory do not have to make narrative 
concessions in order to maintain credibility, Elizabeth’s letter to her brother assumed a 
candid tone, revealing potentially shameful family intimacies.  She did not intend for it to 
be used in a court of law—rather she vented her personal frustrations into a written 
narrative that memorializes her shock, pain, and disbelief in the fragility of her racial 
identity.  She risks less in this private note by telling her brother of the full circle of their 
family history.   Her double-sided rendition actually makes her arguments more 
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believable, as the full inclusion of all stories, proud and less proud, indicates the 
unlikelihood of consciously selective historical memory.   The dialectic of Elizabeth’s 
flattering and unfavorable recitations lend authenticity to her claims, but they do not 
unquestionably clear the Remleys from the taint of blackness.   
William’s one-sided letters and memorandum memorialize his contrivance of the 
family past.  His renditions appear to have juridical utility, as he supplies the attorney to 
which the letter is directed with possible arguments for dismissing Shrine’s allegations. 
Short on emotion,  he turns instead to outcome-oriented methods of attack.  Like Mr. 
Carteret in Chesnutt’s Marrow, the husband eagerly seeks to establish a whitewashed 
past.  In this way of bantering about the subject, William Hubbell consciously constructs 
the past in a manner that creates a desired outcome.  He presents the intermediary facts 
(according to his memory) that carry the story from start to finish.  In examining his 
renditions, we realize a prime example of contrived historical memory.  As an in-law 
rather than a descendant, William could not have been present at any of the events that he 
discusses.  He also is unfamiliar with many of the parties in these stories, yet he assumes 
a narrative authority in representing a family history as an unquestionable, irreproachable 
fact.   
Mr. Hubbell’s rendition offers a radically different explanation for Mrs. Remley’s 
alleged status. Although he has never met the accuser or her informant, Mary Mitchell, he 
surmises that Mitchell’s accusation, which she conveyed to Shrine, who conveyed it to 
the Court, derives from spite, jealousy, or hate.  He claims that Leah Whitley, before her 
marriage to Thomas, jilted Joseph Mitchell, who in turn married Mary Mitchell, the 
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informant.95  Embittered by a prolonged two years of rejection, Mitchell maliciously told 
others that Leah was a “colored slave.”  Presumably, William has no personal knowledge 
of these events, seeing that Mrs. Shrine was previously unknown to him.  However, his 
knowledge suffices to align the past with a respectable script of Southern racial purity 
and social status that discards the incursive and unfounded greed of “ignorant low 
people.”96 
Aligning history with contemporary claims necessitates an active remembering of 
the past.  Both Elizabeth and her husband William created lively renditions of the Remley 
past in order protect their testamentary legitimacy.  It seems that Mrs. Shrine’s claim 
never penetrated the veil of believability for either the Court or the Remleys, but her 
farfetched claim provides an illuminating script to analyze the use of race as an qualifier 
of standing for inheritance.  These personal manipulations of history demonstrate how 
silence and embellishment characterize the labor of historical remembrance. 
 
III. Race and the Limits of Family 
At the same time that Elizabeth’s panicked letter recorded her fear of the threat of 
miscegenation, her brother Paul Remley maintained a mixed race family of his own in 
Charleston.  Elizabeth’s and William’s separate letters did not allude to this fact, which 
generates two possibilities.  First, the Hubbells, due to geographical separation from the 
younger Paul, could simply have remained unaware of his miscegenous liaison.  From the 
tone expressed in her letter, she did not couch or soften her views of interracial sex, 
which she described as “degrading” and “low.”  If she did hold concerns about her 
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brother’s feelings, perhaps she would not have expressed such untrammeled hostility 
toward a type of relationship which her own brother supported.  From another view, her 
enmity toward Shrine and her accusations could precisely cut at Durbin’s family.  In 
finding a subject to channel her frustrations and convictions, she demonstrates her 
disapproval of miscegenation to her brother without explicit mention of his own 
transgressions.  Most likely, this latter interpretation is correct, as later correspondence 
proves Elizabeth’s knowledge.  
Apparently, Durbin lived a quiet life as a wealthy planter in the Carolina 
Lowcountry.  Few, if any, texts of state history record his name as a prominent figure in 
Southern politics, agricultural affairs, or Charleston society.   At the time he applied to 
administer his father’s will in 1861, he lived on a plantation known as Remley’s Point in 
the Charleston District.  On this 305 acre plot situated in Christ Church Parish at the 
junction of the Cooper and Wando Rivers,97 Paul D. Remley lived with his slave Philis 
and their two children (Appendix 2).  Durbin also owned a brick house and lot on Society 
Street in downtown Charleston, which was a common practice for wealthy planters in the 
Carolina Lowcountry.98  These two properties, along with other uninhabited town lots,99 
demonstrate his economic comfort.  State records show that he bought and sold slaves 
fairly regularly.100  
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No official bill of purchase exists for the slave Philis, but census records loosely 
provide an understanding of who she was.   In 1861, she would have been approximately 
18 years old, the mother of a seven-year old son Charles, and pregnant with her daughter 
Cecile.101  The 1870 census lists both her and Cecile as “black” rather than “mulatto,” so 
we may assume that Philis and her daughter were of sufficiently dark complexion as to 
lead the census taker to classify them as of unmixed blood.  This declaration contrasts 
with her private life, where she lived at Remley’s Point.  As the slave mistress of Paul D. 
Remley, she tacitly assumed the role of wife and paramour, as he remained unmarried 
throughout his life.  As the mother of his only two children, Philis claimed a distinct role 
at Remley’s Point.  Nominally a slave but almost a wife, she assumed an ambiguous role 
of partner and servant not unknown to women of color in the antebellum South.102   
Interracial sex and cohabitation existed in the antebellum South within unspoken 
codes of behavior.   Durbin could maintain Philis and their children at his plantation with 
impunity because her slave status eviscerated any claim of legitimacy on their sexual 
relationship.  Even though South Carolina law allowed for interracial marriage, it applied 
to free blacks only, thus preventing the legal legitimization of miscegenous relationships 
between master and slave.  Slavery precluded any legally recognized relationships, thus 
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securing the sexual freedom of white men.  Furthermore, Durbin and Philis did not 
challenge what Adrienne Davis has termed the Southern “sexual economy”103 by 
flaunting their relationship in public, according to the available records.   
 
D. Durbin’s Death 
Yet Durbin would show his appreciation for this relationship upon his death.  He 
died on December 25, 1863 while hunting, which Philis describes in a letter as “the 
discharge of his Gun by shooting marsh hens in company with Major Bolks and John 
Antley the ball entered his lungs of which he survived 13 days after being shot[.]”104  In 
his will, he provided for his slave-widow and their children an annuity of $500 per year, 
to be paid from the sales of his property both real and personal (See Appendix 3).105  He 
also bequeathed “his Negroes,” meaning Philis, Charles, and Cecile, to a friend “to have 
the labor and services of the said slaves and their issue for and during his natural life.”106  
Durbin did not intend to relegate his family to a state of abject slavery, but to place them 
“under the control of kind and indulgent owners, who will, whenever the law permits 
manumit and make them free.”107   
South Carolina courts frequently tried such issues.  In Fable & Franks v. Brown, a 
white man established a trust in his will for his two “illegitimate coloured children by a 
female slave.”108  The plaintiffs, claiming to be the next of kin of the testator, objected to 
the will, claiming that such bequests to slaves were invalid.  On appeal, the court 
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approved the bequest on its face, upholding the testator’s wishes.  As a caveat, however, 
the court compared the man’s will to the freedom of providing posthumous support for a 
favorite pet or object, saying, “Die and endow, a college or a cat.”109  Even though the 
court validated the will, the property reverted to the state, because slaves, as property, 
could not inherit.   
Durbin’s scheme differs, however, because of timing, thus allowing 
circumvention of the legal prohibition on slave bequests and manumissions.  He did not 
leave his property to his slave family directly, but to an administrator to carry out his 
wishes.  In this testamentary trust, his family would receive the interest resulting from the 
state of his personal property that he could not leave to them directly because they were 
slaves.110 Additionally, he did not manumit the slaves in his will, but he allowed for its 
possibility in the future, but at the time of probate, this issue was moot.  Had the will 
been executed while Phillis and the children remained slaves, the court may have 
followed Fable. 
Durbin’s semantics of slavery in his will deserves further scrutiny.  Although 
Philis argues that she and her children had been emancipated by the time he wrote his 
will, he nevertheless referred to them as though they were slaves.  Had he left them 
property directly, he would have placed their interests in jeopardy considering that the 
1841 prohibition on slave bequests had yet to be overturned.111  Additionally, he did not 
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free them in the will, but he expressed the hope that their new owners would manumit 
them “whenever the law permits.”112  Although the Emancipation Proclamation affected 
many states, it did not necessarily free all slaves in South Carolina, and all slaves, 
regardless of residence, were freed by the 13th Amendment in 1865.  In referring to them 
as slaves, Durbin captures a memory of them as favored and faithful servants instead of 
beloved and deserving family members.  In this move, he formally maintains distance 
between himself and Philis, thus underscoring a Southern code of racial propriety.   
Durbin’s goodwill toward his black family makes a strong statement as to his 
parental allegiances. Although he does not acknowledge his children as his blood, his 
testamentary wishes clearly state his economic concerns for his family, and he 
memorializes his intimacy with Philis in a legal document that leaves little room for 
alternative explanations.  He expressed a desire to sell his property “to be appropriated 
for the use, clothing and comfort in sickness and health” for her and the children.113 In 
this document, he rejects the interests of his collateral white heirs, which he noticeably 
refrains from mentioning until the end of the will.  In this devise, he leaves his residual 
estate to his mother Mary Remley, and upon her death to his sister Emma.  In no place in 
the will does he mention his sister Elizabeth Hubbell.  
The Remley case stands apart from other interracial inheritance cases because of 
the prevalent influence of the Civil War.  Durbin’s will remained untouched for three 
years after his death, which coincides with the war’s end.  Presumably, hostilities 
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between the Union and the Confederacy deterred not only the rapid administration of 
wills, but also communications between North and South.  Correspondence amongst 
multiregional families such as the Remleys dissipated to such an extent that years passed 
without hearing news from relatives in distant places. This case is no exception, and 
postwar letters circulated amongst the family demonstrate delayed notifications of salient 
events.  In the period between Durbin’s death and the subsequent litigation, the 
transformations of war raise this standard yet mildly transgressive postmortem 
distribution to a juridical exercise of reconstructing the past.  
The end of the Civil War left the Hubbells and the Remleys in remarkably 
different epistemological standpoints.  In Philadelphia, Elizabeth R. Hubbell and her 
husband persisted in their objection to Mrs. Shrine’s attack on their race and freedom.  
William Hubbell retained the rebuttal letter he wrote in 1861, in sight of securing his 
wife’s share in the elder Remley’s will, which was distributed at that time.  A subsequent 
note attached to Hubbell’s letter verifies that it was “not sent on account of hostilities 
proceeding.”114  During this same period, Mrs. Mary Remley died intestate—news which 
did not reach Charleston until after the war.  On April 12 and May 20, 1865—soon after 
General Robert. E. Lee’s surrender at Appomattox—the sisters Emma and Elizabeth 
wrote their brother in Charleston to inform him of their mother’s death in 1863.  Equally 
heartbreaking events in Charleston would add to the family’s wartime losses. 
Correspondence from Charleston completes the cycle of belated information 
about uncommunicated family episodes.  As proxy for Durbin, Philis responds to the 
sisters on June 1, 1865, with her own tragic news of Durbin’s death.  In this response, she 
conveys a sense of loneliness, despair, and depression.  On both sides of the envelope, in 
                                                 
114 W. HUBBELL MEMO, supra note 90. 
 34 
Philadelphia and Charleston, initial and remembered reactions to family members’ deaths 
illustrate subjective representations of the past that spark a frenzy of responses.  Most 
notably, each of these death notices did not intend to stir up controversy—rather, they 
aimed to inform the reader of a family loss and to inaugurate a forum for mutual 
sympathy and mourning.  In turn, these letters initiated legal battles.  
Philis’s letter sparks a chain of events that leads to the eventual dispute over 
inheritance.  In this correspondence, she conveys an intimacy with Durbin that alludes to 
mutual intimacy.  A full two years after his death, she recalls:  
My Dear Mistress the morning of which he died was Christmas on that 
Morning he Called me to wash him saying that he felt so much better and 
said that he did not think that his mother was alive and was Desirous of 
seeing his sisters also he said on the Morning that Christmas Morning was 
a Mourning Day to the Family which after he called on me to give Him 
the Bible to read of which I did & said that he was thankful to God for his 
Mercies towards Him to spare his life to see that happy Morning[.]115 
 
This candid vignette shows intimacy between Durbin and Philis that she relays without 
hesitation to his two white sisters.  The act of bathing him and listening to his deathbed 
declarations may indeed be translated as quotidian duties of a servant, but the close and 
private nature of this interaction reveals a mutual inclination toward familiarity and 
comfort that goes beyond master and slave.  Furthermore, epistolary formalities of that 
time may have led her to express disingenuous courtesy in her writing.  However, the 
remarkable social and racial asymmetry of Phillis and the white sisters gives way to a 
confidence in the former black slave’s writing that seems to empower her straightforward 
communication.  Philis nevertheless remains deferential and observant in her writing by 
repeatedly referring to Durbin as “My Dear Master,” but she also conveys her attachment 
to him by eventually admitting “you do not know how it destroyed me” and that “I truly 
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Miss him.”116  At the close of her letter, she pleads for the sisters to return to Charleston 
“to relieve [her] Distressing mind” and to “find a Friend.”  The exercise of recalling her 
beloved’s death renewed the pain she once felt, as she laments, “I would say more but by 
heart ache me to think of the past or look at the present.”117 
  Philis’s closing sentiments portend a conflict of interests that are intensified and 
complicated by the aftermath of the Civil War.  In thinking about the past, she recalls 
Durbin not only as the father of her two children, but also as a protector and provider.  
His death tragically marked the end of that security, and also the promised beginning of 
her freedom.  At the time of Durbin’s death, President Lincoln had issued the 
Emancipation Proclamation, which declared that “all persons held as slaves…shall be 
then, thenceforward, and forever free[.]”118  This decree most likely did not change 
Philis’s slave status, as South Carolina remained a rebellious state that resisted actual 
emancipation until the physical arrival of Union troops.119  The possibility of the 
exceptional change in her status would have entangled Durbin’s will in a problematic 
archaism—he made provisions for slave succession after emancipation and these 
promises found no political or legal grounding.  The will also constructed a trust for 
Philis and the children, which under the 1841 law, prohibited bequests to slaves.  
Possibly freed, but indicated as slaves in the will, Durbin’s legacy to Philis, Charles, and 
Cecile, as a post-emancipation testament, made itself vulnerable to attack. 
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E. Contesting Durbin’s Will 
 One may object that Philis’s communication survives as an example of polite 
letter writing, but such gentility must not be confused with genuine affection, in light of 
the sister’s eventual realization of her relationship with Durbin.  Generally, interracial 
relationships and the children they produced did not lead slave women to actively seek 
the friendship of their master’s sisters. From the sentiments indicated in the 
correspondence between Philis and the sisters, no ill will existed that invoked a conflict 
over the legitimacy of the interracial liaison.  The tone of Philis’s letter indicates warm 
familiarity with Elizabeth and Emma, and the white sisters did not resort to legal strategy 
to actively deny miscegenation in the interests of excluding Durbin’s black family.  Overt 
interracial denial did not emerge as a primary objection to the will, although it was 
contained in the subtext.  In this contest, the sisters objected to the will on three primary 
grounds: 1) that testamentary transfers to slaves were invalid; 2) that Durbin appropriated 
his father’s estate for his own use and enjoyment; and 3) that the postwar devaluation of 
Durbin’s estate deprived them of any interest in his property.   
 These charges are further complicated by Durbin’s failure to include his sister 
Elizabeth in his will.  In objection to this exclusion, counsel for the Hubbells contended 
that the will intended to spite Elizabeth and her mother by “putting the Negroes over” 
their interests.120  Available documents do not record any preliminary disputes between 
Durbin and Elizabeth, but it is evident that sometime between her 1861 letter and his 
1863 death, something influenced him to exclude her from his will.  Still, he was 
“Desirous of seeing his sisters” at the time of his death, as Philis wrote to Elizabeth in her 
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letter.  She, along with her sister and her mother, comprised the limited circle of his 
legitimate next of kin.   
 Durbin’s will serves as intriguing memoranda of a socially averted yet physically 
manifested chapter of slaveholding society.  Yet this case turns that silence on its head.  
In re Remley does not stand alone by any means—other cases in South Carolina 
exemplify the not uncommon practice of miscegenation and concomitant testamentary 
expressions of compassion.121  The sheer frequency of inheritance, tax, and criminal 
litigation that ensued in southern antebellum courts regarding interracial issues 
demonstrates the existence of a “problem” that could not be avoided.  Furthermore, these 
cases attest to the law’s ability to entertain objections to formal recognitions of mixed 
race.  In examining these legal documents, a contradictory pattern emerges.  Southern 
propriety and racial etiquette championed the nonexistence of mixed race, yet particular 
laws commemorated the existence and persistence of a supposedly nonexistent 
phenomenon. The transfer of property and wealth from white to black memorializes the 
testator’s preference to designate these goods in the interests of his mixed race family.  
This deliberate act of prioritizing the economic interests of his black family invites a 
public postmortem discussion of miscegenation that in his lifetime, remained purely 
private.  In this act, he calls upon law to investigate, affirm, and sustain the legitimacy of 
his subjective articulation of family. 
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1. The Slavery Claim 
 The intention to establish a trust for Philis and the children immediately drew the 
attention of the Hubbells, who viewed them not as eligible parties for a testamentary 
transfer, but as bonded persons precluded from exercising legal and economic 
interests.122  A bill of complaint opposing Philis’s interest described the bequest as 
“contrary to Equity and good conscience.”123  This rebuttal draws upon a conception of 
the past that eternally equates blackness with slavery.   Even though Durbin wrote his 
will after Lincoln’s emancipation of Philis and the children, common sense would dictate 
that the Hubbells’ slavery claim found no legitimate ground.  Still, Elizabeth and her 
husband persisted to contest Durbin’s intent to provide for and support his chosen family; 
they saw not a family but a gang of slaves that threatened their free and racialized interest 
in his estate.   
In their re-creation of the past, the Hubbells necessarily draw upon the twin 
factors of distance and time.  By establishing a story based on past facts, the final 
narrative, augmented by the transformative elements of physical and temporal proximity, 
does not necessarily represent the absolute truth.  It is important to realize that the parties 
had not seen each other since before the Civil War, and they lived in different regions of 
the country.  For the white Hubbells of Philadelphia to contemplate the black Remleys of 
Charleston, they must traverse years of separation, and miles in distance.  Being removed 
from the South, the Hubbells’ memory of antebellum Charleston perhaps drew from their 
own experiences of seeing Philis and her children as slaves and of enslaved blacks in 
general.  Moreover, the effects of the war could have hardened their previous conceptions 
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of their homeland, and the act of revisiting these images exacerbates and intensifies those 
previous convictions.  
Their focus on the slave status of Philis and her children demonstrates the 
Hubbells’ racially motivated objections, and they rely on race privilege as a persuasive 
method for denying the validity of the will.  They do not deny the existence of the 
miscegenous relationship, as their correspondence demonstrates this knowledge.  
Because they did not directly attack Philis and her children’s racial status as impediments 
to inheritance, the slavery argument displaces this expected rebuttal by fixating on their 
former lives as slaves.  Presumably, the Hubbells realized the weakness of this objection 
to the will, seeing that its postwar execution and contestation dates made the slavery issue 
almost moot.  Only under Confederate law could this claim have succeeded.   
 Philis readily responded to this fatuous claim by asserting her rights gained as a 
free woman.  In her answer to the Hubbells’ complaint, she insisted upon the validity of 
the will, emphasizing its creation after her manumission.  Arguing for its possible validity 
under the regime of slavery, she emphasized that “having been actually emancipated and 
made free before the distribution of the estate of Paul D. Remley such bequest should be 
held good and valid.”124  On the strength of this claim, she succeeded in establishing her 
ability to inherit property. 
 
2. Whether Durbin’s “Appropriation” was Proper 
Competing conceptions of the past reemerge in the interpretation of “property” of 
the elder Paul Remley’s estate.  As stated above, the Hubbells maintained that Philis and 
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her children were ineligible to inherit as slaves, but they expanded this argument by also 
asserting that the slaves existed as part of the elder Remley’s estate.  In this line of 
thought, their father’s death entitled them to a share in the slave property, which they 
argued that Durbin “appropriated them to his own use and purposes.”125  They expected 
Durbin, once appointed as administrator of the estate, to convert the father’s personal 
property into money and divide the proceeds equally amongst the heirs.  Of this personal 
property, which William Hubbell estimated at $36,000, Elizabeth, Emma, and Durbin 
would each receive $12,000.126 
In the interest of securing a share in Durbin’s estate, the Hubbells appropriated the 
meaning of chattel slavery.  Here, they did not view Philis as a long-term acquaintance or 
fellow heir, but as merchandise which Durbin mishandled in the administration of his 
father’s estate.  Philis shifts from an article of property to an obstruction of right, one that 
displaces their expectation to inheritance.  In other words, Durbin’s enumeration of Philis 
as a beneficiary rather than a parcel reduces the total value of the money they argued 
belonged to them.  
He says they are his slaves and then dispenses of their services as his own 
property to another person, exclusive of the other heirs—“expressis imicis 
alterias exclusis.”  If they as he says are taken as his and dispenses of by 
him as his then he excludes the other heirs and they can claim for value 
received by him.127 
 
Philis, they believed, was not exclusively Durbin’s.  Even though he called them “my 
negroes Philis and her children,”128 the Hubbells claimed they were theirs as well.  This 
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way of remembering the past, although legally motivated, aims to diminish the status of 
Philis as a rightful beneficiary.  Even by invoking her monetary value, they cannot 
reasonably relegate her to slave status, but they can insist on recovering this money to 
aggrandize a greater share than Durbin had allotted.  Thus, in describing Philis as an 
object of property rather than its recipient, the white collateral heirs seek financial 
security through a shrewd manipulation of the past.  
 
3. The Devaluation of Durbin’s Estate 
The value of Durbin’s estate directly relates to the outcome of the Civil War.  He 
wrote his will after the war began, taking into account the then-current value of his 
property.  At that time, he considered his estate valuable enough to yield $500 a year for 
the comfort and clothing of Philis and her children.  Alternatively, he authorized his 
trustee James Gray to pay them the amount in full “if in his judgment he shall deem it 
judicious and proper.”129  This estimate of his finances and holdings predated the fall of 
the Confederacy and the collapse of its economy.  Durbin remained aware of the possible 
effects of the war, as he directed his executors to invest his money conservatively to 
safeguard his postmortem worth throughout the war.   He entrusted them to invest in 
“safe Securities, or real estate…until the declaration of peace between these Confederate 
States and the United States[.]”130 
 Durbin’s antebellum legacy to his black family, which would not take effect until 
after the war, makes an intriguing study of the influences of history on memory.  At once, 
the document encompasses three modes of temporality: past, present, and future, each 
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intervening to construct, commemorate, and sustain a posterity of interracial wealth 
marked by the mercurial economy of the embattled South.  When he wrote his will he 
remembered his property as he could only imagine—the economic upheaval of the 
agrarian based political system which supplied his wealth superseded his testamentary 
objectives.  As much as he tried to secure his property for Philis, he could not accurately 
account for the devaluation of his estate that would swallow his secondary bequests to his 
mother Mary and sister Emma.  From his standpoint, the subversive act of enriching the 
economic lives of his black kin would transcend his death.  In his own act of 
remembering and securing the past, he could not contemplate an unforeseen and 
unprecedented future.   
 The Civil War’s effect on property values generated additional testimonies. His 
executor, Optimus Hughes, submitted an answer to the Equity Court that described the 
conditions of the estate in the aftermath of the Civil War.  Returning to Charleston after 
serving in the Confederate Army, Hughes found his papers and accounts destroyed.  He 
recalled the poor economic climate, saying that “everybody was oppressed with anxiety 
and great poverty scarcely knowing what to do to obtain food for their families.”131 
 The disinherited Hubbells argued that the legacy to Philis and her children 
deprived them of their fair share in distribution.  Objecting to the “fallacy of [Durbin’s] 
expectations,” they were not “willing to bear all the losses and give her the full measure 
of the legacy.”132  Here lies a problem of ademption as a result of interstate conflict.  In 
an 1866 memorandum to their attorneys, the Hubbells contended: 
But as to Durbin’s will it was made with the view that there would be no loss 
in the Estate—but under the Southern Confederacy would be valuable and that 
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he could afford to give her $500 a year on 8,000 or so absolutely out of his 
share—and have much left.133 
 
Their primary objection to Durbin’s will focuses not only on the devaluation, then, but 
also his misappropriation of property to which they felt entitled.  While the two sisters 
had moved north to Pennsylvania, Durbin remained in South Carolina, inhabiting the 
valuable plantation at Remley’s Point and the other properties in Charleston.  They 
believed that even if Durbin’s will did not make them primary beneficiaries, they 
deserved a share in their father’s estate, which they believed Durbin had hoarded for 
himself.  If his executors sold this property to provide for Philis, she would take “their” 
property. 
  
F. Testamentary Freedom and the Interpretation of the Past 
 The performative aspect of will disputes surfaces in the courts, where competing 
conceptions of the past come forth.   Three parties offer different versions of what the 
testator intended to bequeath to the heirs:  First, the deceased party offers a written 
document as evidence of his intentions.  In this testamentary language, he outlines 
desired plans for the estate after his death in the presence of witnesses that can attest to its 
veracity.  Durbin, with three witnesses and an equal number of executors, constructed a 
plan to support his companion and their children beyond his death.  Second, the named 
beneficiary offers a similar conception of the past, and she persists in proving the will as 
legal and valid.  Philis insisted that Durbin, as the head of her household, earnestly 
intended for her entitlement to his estate.  As an explicitly listed distributee, she offers the 
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will itself as proof of his unquestionable design.134  Lastly, the objectors to the will 
submit an alternative version of the true intention of the will, and they envision a 
radically different plan of distribution, which they argue as the appropriate version.  
According to each of these parties, their version of the past stands as correct. 
 But in litigation, multiple versions of the same story always exist.  Without this 
conflict, the issue would become moot; unequal and unpleasant distributions would not 
occur, everyone would agree, and all would accede to a singular account of history.  
Obviously, that is not the case here, where creative construction works to promote the 
subjective interest of any claimant.  These multifarious renditions approach Faulknerian 
proportions in their radically selective interpretations of what happened.  The divisive 
and tumultuous factor of race institutes an additional narrative convention in recreating 
the past and viewing the family, and interracial conflicts aptly illustrate this interpretive 
diversity.  As argued by Paul Antze and Michael Lambek, these interpretive conventions 
greatly influence the types of actors and events that receive attention, and also the kinds 
of evidence accepted as testaments to the past.135  In interracial inheritance disputes, 
objectors to miscegenous testamentary bequests appeal to abstract notions of racial 
boundaries in order to deny the existence of mixed race.  Often times, South Carolina 
courts observed the testator’s wishes.136   
 In the Remley case, the collateral heirs indeed objected to the interracial will, as 
they appealed to the Equity Court to “cut the Negroes out entirely.”137 They recognized 
that Durbin’s bequest to his black family was “sufficient to take up the whole of his 
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interest in his father’s Estate and that there [was] nothing left for any other party.”138  By 
excluding his mistress and children, the sisters attempted to erase the recorded legacy that 
entitled former slaves, then current kin, to a share in Durbin’s estate.  William Hubbell 
wrote a letter advising his attorneys to “attack…the validity of the will itself” and to 
absorb all of Durbin’s interest to “[leave] nothing for it to take effect upon.”139  Their 
objections to the will, in addition to procuring additional wealth for themselves, stem 
from their displeasure with Durbin’s tenuous relationship with his white family.  They 
complained that Durbin “never wrote to them, nor sent anything during the Rebellion” 
and that “he never sent them a dollar.”140  Additionally, “he did not even send his Mother 
money to pay his Father’s funeral expenses.”141 
 These letters of objection reveal a desire to reinvent a familial history devoid of 
the taint of miscegenation.  Hubbell writes that they wish to “undo what has been done,” 
explicitly rejecting the past that Durbin had memorialized in his will.142  In denying the 
testator’s death wishes, the collateral heirs recreate history in their own image, 
championing themselves as the legally and racially eligible distributees.  Despite the fact 
that Durbin’s wishes were recorded on paper and ratified by witnesses, the white tentative 
heirs retell a story of Durbin’s ill health, arguing that his disabled condition from the gun 
wound led him to write an invalid will.  Only “with a load of shot and wad in his lungs,” 
they argue, could they rationalize Durbin’s wishes to spite his family for a gaggle of 
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slaves.143  According to this line of thought, respectable white persons would not 
reasonably relinquish their property and wealth to bastards and Negroes.  
  Although the white collateral heirs’ depiction of Durbin’s infirmity and 
irresponsibility garnered sympathy from the Equity Court, they did not wholly attempt to 
derail Philis from her proper inheritance.  But this nominal inclusion must not be 
confused with accepting her as a legitimate distributee.  They recognized Philis not as 
part of Durbin’s family, but as a servant to their father who deserved compensation “in 
consideration of her attention…in his sickness at the Point two or three years before his 
death.”144  Seeing themselves as the primary heirs rather than Philis and her children, the 
white heirs agreed to allot $2,000 “for her comfort, when she as things proceed proves 
worthy of it.” 145  In stark contrast to Durbin’s testamentary intent, Philis received a 
pittance while Elizabeth took the majority of his estate. The Equity Court Master 
approved this consolation scheme, recommending that “it be accepted as advantageous to 
[Philis].”146 
 
Conclusion 
The conflict that instigated In re Remley escaped traditional legal methods of 
resolution.  The complex nature of the case required special attention that the courts of 
the common law could not adequately provide.  Due to the radical changes in the South’s 
political, economic, and legal climate caused by the Civil War, pertinent law that directly 
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and fairly addressed the postwar administration of an antebellum interracial will did not 
exist.  Moreover, probate of the will, so soon after the war, yet four years after the 
testator’s death, lingered in the postwar instability of South Carolina’s legal system. 
Ademption of Durbin’s estate hinged on whether or not Philis and the children could be 
considered a loss of “property” and also a misappropriation of the elder Remley’s estate.   
Yet, no slave system existed at the time of probate to fund the estate.  Thus, South 
Carolina’s Equity Court heard the case because it did not fit into existing rules of law, 
administering a ruling with a heightened sensitivity to the individual interests of the 
parties.147  This courtly invocation of empathy viewed the disinheritance of white heirs 
(in favor of black ones) as a viable application for equitable principles.   
 In re Remley, which spans both antebellum and postwar regimes, forces an 
examination of public secrets being legally recognized.  As Austin Sarat argues, 
“memory may be attached, or attach itself, to law and be preserved in and through 
law.”148  This method of constructing the past in relation to the juridical structures 
particular to a place and time works to legitimate and authorize an historical account of 
possibilities and improbabilities.  This is a surprising result from a contemporary 
viewpoint.  To imagine that a former slave’s right to inheritance decreased after the Civil 
War confounds a modern understanding of historical memory.  It is far easier to imagine 
Philis’s chances of inheritance as secure after the war, but it is more difficult to interpret 
her diminishing rights after the domestic conflict that presumably attempted to enable 
them.  Furthermore, to examine her shrinking interest in Durbin’s estate in light of his 
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testamentary wishes presents a peculiar definition of “equity.”  While this translates to an 
overt assertion of racial supremacy in objection to clear testamentary intent, it also 
demonstrates a shrewd manipulation of legal definitions of family.  The Hubbells portray 
his effort as a wanton death desire of a country planter “with a load of shot and wad in his 
lungs.”149 
The claim of incapacity allows the collateral heirs to make legal sense of Durbin’s 
unconventional assertion of a multiracial family in the antebellum and postwar South.150 
Yet, Durbin did not marry Philis, even though Philis was technically not a slave and state 
law permitted interracial marriages at the time of his death.  Had he married her, his 
siblings would not have had legal grounds to contest the will, and the combination of her 
free status and her spousal protection would have enabled her to inherit without 
restriction.  Yet, South Carolina law enabled the white heirs to succeed in their will 
challenge because the legal system upheld the restricted notion of a white, legitimate, 
recognized family—which did not include Philis and the children. 
 State law resisted the probate of Durbin’s will as he intended.  His testamentary 
objective was clear—he wanted to provide for Philis and the children, and leave his sister 
with nothing.  The competing conceptions of family—his black one and his white one—
find different treatments in South Carolina courts.  Even though he made provisions for 
Philis’s “use, clothing and comfort,” his testamentary maneuvering could not overcome 
the legal privilege accorded to free whites.  His collateral heirs were able to capitalize 
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upon the law’s favoring of free persons as a way of denying any recognition of Philis as a 
family member.  Moreover, the massive transformations stemming from the Civil War 
changed the composition of Durbin’s estate.  The Civil War, the Emancipation 
Proclamation, and the weakening of the southern plantocracy undermined Philis’s claim 
to her share of Durbin’s property.  He neither lived to see the economic devaluation of his 
property nor the legal wranglings that weakened his own family’s testamentary interests. 
He did not foresee that law would force his posthumous gifts toward the family that he 
wished to ignore. These influences, in addition to the challenges presented by the 
Hubbells, precluded Philis, the rightful heir, from obtaining the legacy that Durbin had 
established to recognize his mixed-race family.  
 The story of the Remleys effectively demonstrates the legal parameters of the 
Southern white family. First, Mary Shrine could have jeopardized the Remely’s ability to 
inherit from their father’s estate if they were found to have African ancestry.  Mrs. Shrine 
could have limited the definition of legitimate family to those persons who could prove 
themselves white. Secondly, Durbin’s collateral heirs relied upon the racial privilege 
afford them by law to deny Philis of a monetary legacy that would recognize and perhaps 
legitimate her own family. The likelihood of their surprise at the relationship between 
Durbin and Philis is low.  Yet, the fictional barricade that facilitated white denial in the 
face of blatant knowledge acted to deny people of color from taking part in the benefits 
accorded to legally recognized family members.151 Not limited to finances alone, law’s 
role in maintaining the silence of interracial intimacy creates a social belief of the 
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improbability of amalgamated families. Basing the legitimacy of heirship and the absence 
of marriage on race rather than blood or testamentary choice underscores the narrative 
privilege that white collateral heirs could hold over relatives (white) who wanted to 
protect “other” relatives (of color).  In this way, the larger legal system supported the 
testamentary larceny in blatant contradiction to explicit legal language recognizing, 
promoting, and memorializing intimate connections between black and white.  In the case 
of the Remleys, Durbin’s “family” did not exist as a reality in a legal regime that defined 
intimacy in terms of black and white, with nothing in between.  
 
